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Abstract  
The impact of the introduction of the EU Single Area Payments (SAP) on farm strategy is 
investigated for a sample of Lithuanian farms, utilising farm accounting and survey data. The 
applications of two investment models demonstrate that the credit market in Lithuania was 
imperfect  prior  to  accession  and  that  some  farms  were  financially  constrained.  The 
introduction of the SAP has a significant, positive influence on farmers’ intentions to expand 
their farm area compared to a baseline scenario of the continuation of pre-accession policy. 
The  switch  in policy  has  a  more pronounced  effect  on  farms  that  were previously  credit 
constrained. While the SAP has been presented as a policy support that is decoupled from 
production, its introduction will nevertheless have ex post coupled effects, most notably an 
income multiplier effect on credit constrained farmers. 
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1.  Introduction 
Accession  to  the  European  Union  (EU)  and,  specifically,  adoption  of  the  Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) has led to a substantial increase in real support to farmers in most 
of the New Member States (NMS) of Central and Eastern Europe, through the implementation 
of  the  Single  Area  Payment  (SAP).  The  payments  are  decoupled  from  production  and 
distributed on a simple flat-rate, per hectare basis and are much higher than pre-accession 
national support. In addition, NMS can top-up SAP, up to agreed limits, with national funds. 
Given the centrality of direct payments, any understanding of the effect of adoption of the 
CAP in the NMS, requires an assessment of the impact of the SAP on farmers’ behaviour. 
However,  remarkably  little  attention  has  been  given  to  understanding  the  relationships 
between  the  SAP  and  farm  strategies  and,  as  yet,  no  consensus,  has  emerged  on  likely 
impacts. For instance, while some have argued that adoption of the CAP will lock farmers 
into agriculture and therefore impede structural change (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006), others 
see accession as an important catalyst for rapid adjustment (Raiser et al., 2003). 
This paper contributes to this debate by focusing on one of the key issues affecting farm 
strategy, namely farmers’ financial constraints. Although the SAP, is decoupled (ex ante), it 
may  still  have  (ex  post)  an  income  effect  and  stimulate  farm  investment  and  thus  farm 
expansion. In the case of perfect credit markets, transfers through decoupled payments should 
not affect farm investment and production. However, credit markets are in general imperfect, 
largely  due  to  asymmetric  information,  screening,  monitoring  and  enforcement  problems 
(Hoff et al., 1993). Due to this, lenders may ration borrowers by refusing to fund part or all of 
their loan applications. Such credit market issues are exacerbated in agriculture, particularly 
during the period of transition to a market economy (Latruffe, 2005; Petrick, 2004; Davis et 
al.,  2003;  Swinnen  and  Gow,  1999).  Thus,  transfers  through  decoupled  payments  may 
improve liquidity and therefore reduce farmers’ borrowing costs. In the context of accession 
to the EU, the implementation of generous decoupled payments may help mitigating some of 
these constraints and lead to increased investment. Indeed, when a farm is credit constrained it 
might underutilise productive assets compared to a situation of no constraints (Sadoulet et al., 
2001). However, as the CAP payments represent a secure and increasing stream of income, 
borrowers can pledge an increase in their repayment capacity (Collender and Morehart, in 
ERS/USDA 2004). Additionally, land values are expected to increase due to the capitalisation 
of  support post  accession  and  this  will  also  allow farmers  to pledge  more  collateral  (see 
Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2006).    3 
The objective of the paper is to assess the impact of the SAP on farmers’ strategies in the 
NMS. Given that the pre-accession period  was  typically  characterised by  the presence of 
binding credit constraints, the main proposition of this paper is that, the CAP flat-rate area 
payments will relieve liquidity constraints and affect production decisions and the expansion 
of farms. In other words, the SAP could have an ‘income’ effect, as the flat monetary transfers 
increase  farmers’  income  and  may  allow  them  to  purchase  more  production  factors  than 
would have been the case otherwise. The paper draws on farm level data and investigates 
specifically the case of one state that joined the EU in 2004 – Lithuania. The study only 
focuses on commercial farms, which are included in the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN) sample, as they are more likely to be eligible and respond to the change in support. 
To capture the specific effect of the implementation of the CAP, we segment farmers on the 
basis of their financial constraints and assess the linkage with growth intentions under two 
policy scenarios, namely continuing pre-accession policy and implementation of SAP. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the Lithuanian context and 
the following section presents an overview of the methodology and data. Section four presents 
the analytical results and section five concludes. 
 
2.  Lithuanian farms before and after accession 
Before the reforms in the 1990s, agriculture in Lithuania generated 28 percent of GDP 
(OECD,  1996).  The  cost-price  squeeze  during  the  period  of  transition,  late  payments  by 
processors  to  farmers  and  delayed  payments  of  government  subsidies,  augmented  the 
financial problems and tightened the liquidity constraints of many farmers (OECD, 1996). 
The lack of loan finance, in particular, impeded the development of the land market. During 
the mid-1990s, Davies and Cook (1995) carried out a farm survey and found that under the 
then  prevailing  system  farmers  were  credit  constrained.  Credit  constraints  have  been 
recognised by policy makers. The pre-accession policy included interest rate subsidies, that 
accounted for 30-70 percent of the loan interest rate. Nearer to accession, Lithuania provided 
a 50 percent interest rate subsidy on loans for the purchase of agricultural land (Meyers et al., 
2004). A Rural Credit Guarantee Fund was established with the aim of facilitating access to 
credit for farm businesses which did not possess sufficient collateral. Although there were 
improvements in the 2000s, smaller farmers that would have liked to expand their farm were 
still financially constrained.   4 
Accession  to  the  EU  has  increased  the  funds  available  to  farmers.  Prior  to  accession, 
Lithuania implemented direct payments linked to production of selected crops and livestock, 
but their amount was low. For instance, cereals were supported at 11 Euro/ha in 2002 and the 
slaughtered premium was 57 Euro/head. This constitutes the baseline scenario against which 
farmers’ intentions under SAP have been analysed in this study. Post-accession, the SAP for 
crops and grassland was 32.5 Euro/ha in 2004 increasing to 45.6 Euro/ha in 2005. In addition 
the coupled top-ups were almost flat across all crops and grass land – 56.8 Euro/ha in 2004 
and 56.4 Euro/ha in 2005. The only exceptions were flax for fibre with top-ups in 2004 equal 
to  134.2  Euro/ha  and  in  2005  to  124.4  Euro/ha,  and  protein  crops  whose  top-ups  were 
increased from 56.8 Euro/ha in 2004 to 89.7 Euro/ha in 2005. An additional 18.8 Euro/ha on 
all land located in less favoured areas (LFA) has been funded by the Lithuanian government 
as a top-up. Overall there has been  an increase in payments  for most  crop  and livestock 
products since the introduction of the SAP and national top-ups. Exceptions from this are flax 
for fibre and linseed in all regions, and potatoes and vegetables in non LFA regions. Thus, 
farmers  who  are  expected  to benefit  the  most  from  the  change  in policy  are  arable  crop 
producers, the producers of previously unsupported crops, and farmers in LFA.  
 
3.  Methodology and data 
The investigation of the link between farm financial constraints and growth intentions is 
based on a FADN sub-sample of individual farmers and a survey of intentions of the same 
farmers.  Firstly,  FADN  data  for  2000-2002  were  used  to  investigate  whether  investment 
decisions of some farmers in the sample were constrained prior to accession due to a shortage 
of finance. For this, an augmented accelerator investment model is employed, followed by a 
second stage which characterises those farmers who were the most constrained. Secondly, 
intentions of constrained and non-constrained farms are compared, using answers from the 
intention survey. 
First stage: investment model 
Investment models are commonly used to assess the presence of financial constraints in a 
sample.  Standard  investment  models  explain  firms’  investment  decisions  by  relating  the 
firms’ investment demand to explanatory variables that proxy investment opportunities. Then, 
as proposed by Fazzari et al. (1988), a variable representing the firms’ internal resources is 
included in the standard model. If the estimated coefficient for this variable is significant, this   5 
means that some of the sample’s firms face financial constraints. The authors justified this 
approach  by  Modigliani  and  Miller’s  (1958)  claim  that  in  a  perfectly  functioning  capital 
market, internal (retained profits) and external (loans) financings are perfect substitutes, and 
therefore  neither plays  a  role  in  investment  decisions.  Thus,  if proxies  for  any  source  of 
financing have a significant influence in investment demand models, this provides evidence 
of capital market imperfections that constrain some firms financially. A stronger explanation 
is provided by Hubbard (1998), who shows that, in the case of a perfect capital market, the 
firm’s opportunity cost of internal funds is equal to the market interest rate. By contrast, in the 
presence of market imperfections such as information asymmetries, the firm’s shadow cost of 
external financing is greater than the one for internal financing. The gap between both costs 
forces some firms to resort to the cheaper internal source of funds. However, such funds 
might be limited, and therefore, firms’ investment decisions are constrained by the availability 
of  internal  resources.  This  justifies  the  addition  of  an  internal  funds’  proxy  to  standard 
investment models, to test for the presence of financially constrained farms in the sample. 
Investment models with such internal resources’ variable are referred to as augmented. 
Then, a second stage of analysis is required to identify the most financially constrained 
firms. This second stage, mainly introduced by Fazzari et al. (1988), consists in separating the 
sample’s firms into groups of a priori constrained and unconstrained firms. As explained by 
Hubbard (1998) this intuitive approach must use sorting criteria that allows the identification 
of firms that face a wedge between the cost of external and internal financings, compared 
against  those  for  which  both  financings  are  similarly  costly  (unconstrained  firms).  The 
augmented investment model is then re-estimated for each group of firms separately, the most 
constrained group being the one displaying the highest sensitivity to the internal resource 
variable. This splitting approach has been widely used in the literature. Studies conducted for 
the  manufacturing  and  health  sectors,  have  distinguished  between  firms  based  on  four 
principal  characteristics:  maturity  (well  established  businesses  are  known  to  lenders,  thus 
reducing information costs), size (firms with greater collateral), membership of larger groups 
(improving their access to loans), and the nature of the financial and ownership structure (e.g. 
Hoshi et al., 1991; Calem and Rizo, 1995; Aggarwal and Zong, 2006). Regarding studies 
dealing with agriculture, farm size has also been commonly employed, as well as, amongst 
other variables, collateralisable assets, indebtedness level, financial performance and human 
capital (Bierlen and Featherstone, 1998; Benjamin and Phimister, 2002; Chaddad et al., 2005;   6 
Latruffe,  2005).  All  these  variables  capture  researchers’  a  priori  expectations  concerning 
which farms face high external financing costs. 
In this paper, the investment model used is the accelerator model (Koyck, 1954). Based on 
early observations that industries’ demand for new capital increased when demand for the 
final good accelerated, it relates the change in the stock of capital to sales’ growth,. The 
former variable is the investment and the latter variable proxies the farm’s opportunities as 
Hubbard (1998) demonstrated. The standard accelerator model is given by equation (1), while 
the augmented model, to test for the presence of financially constrained farms, is given by 
equation (2). In this model, a cash flow variable is added to equation (1), representing the 

















































  (2) 
where subscript t represents the period, K is the farm total capital stock, I is the gross 
investment, S is the level of sales, CF is the cash flow (calculated as total farm revenue minus 
wages,  rentals  and  interest),  a0,  a1,  and  a2  are  parameters,  and  e  is  the  error  term.  The 
normalisation by the capital stock allows us to control for size effects. Panel data techniques 
are not used to estimate the models in (1) and (2), as the time series is too short (two periods, 
2000-2001 and 2001-2002). Simple ordinary least squares, including a year dummy, are thus 
employed. 
It is expected that, if the sample contains farms that were financially constrained during 
the period studied (2000 to 2002), the cash flow coefficient, a2, has a positive and significant 
sign. In order to identify which farms were the most constrained, farms are split into two sub-
groups using the sample’s 2000 average of specific, discriminating variables as separating 
thresholds. Several discriminating variables are used in turn to create the sub-groups, based 
on  previous  studies  as  mentioned  above:  such  as  human  capital  characteristics  (e.g.  age, 
education, successor, participation in a farmer union); farm characteristics (e.g. initial size, 
reliance  on  farming);  location  (e.g.  regions,  LFA);  indebtedness,  profitability  and  past 
reliance upon subsidies, to capture the possible income effect. Model (2) is then re-estimated 
for  both  sub-groups.  The  sub-group  presenting  the  highest  coefficient  for  the  cash  flow   7 
variable  is  the  most  financially  constrained.  This  method  to  identify  more  financially 
constrained farms has several shortcomings. However, for the objective of this study in which 
it was necessary to have some indication of farms that were more financially constrained 
under  the  pre-accession  period  in  order  to  identify  whether  they  have  different  growth 
intentions under SAP in comparison to the  rest of the sample  farms, this more workable 
method was preferred. 
Second stage: intention survey 
The  post-accession  growth  intentions  of  farmers  are  then  compared  between  the  sub-
groups identified in the first stage, using responses from a survey conducted in early 2005 
within the framework of the EU FP6  IDEMA project, SSPE-CT-2003-502171. While not 
receiving widespread attention, surveys of farmers’ intentions have been seen to offer two 
main research strengths. First, because farmers base their answers on their expectations about 
the evolution of their environment, survey results give a good insight into farmers’ business 
confidence,  which  is  otherwise  difficult  to  capture  (Thomson  and  Tansey,  1982).  This 
provides  a  good  approximation  of  how  farmers  will  behave  in  the  short-run  as  their 
expectations bias  their  intentions  and  decisions  (Harvey,  2000).  Second,  the  reliability  of 
intention-based surveys appears robust as follow-up studies have indicated that the majority 
of surveyed farmers actually implemented their intended behaviour (Harvey, 2000; Thomson 
and Tansey, 1982; Tranter et al., 2004). 
The survey sought to compare farmers’ intentions holding everything else but the policy 
reform constant, in order to understand the potential impact of the implementation of the SAP. 
Respondents were asked to state whether they intended to exit or stay in farming in the next 
five years, and for those who intended to stay whether they planned to increase or decrease 
their  farm  area  or  maintain  the  status  quo  under  two  scenarios:  a  baseline  scenario  of 
continuation  of  the  pre-accession  national  policies,  and  the  scenario  that  entails  the 
introduction of the SAP and national coupled top-ups. 
Sample’s statistics 
Data were collected through face to face interviews in 2005. The sample represented a 
stratified  FADN  sub-sample.  The  farms  sampled  are  fairly  representative  in  terms  of 
Economic Size unit (ESU), but from the point of view of specialisation, Cereals, Oilseeds and 
Proteins  (COP)  and  general  cropping  are  over-represented  whilst  mixed  crops,  mixed 
livestock and others are under-represented. Altogether 220 farmers were interviewed. Among   8 
them, only 152 in each scenario intended to stay the farming sector beyond five years. Among 
those, more respondents would like to expand their farm under the SAP regime than they 
would have done if the national pre-accession policy had remained in place (51 compared to 
24 percent) (Table 1). This provides the first indication that the introduction of SAP has lifted 
some obstacles to farm expansion. 
Table 1: Share of respondents who intend to grow in size, decrease or remain constant under 
both scenarios (%) 
  Intend to 
grow in 
size 
Intend to keep the 
same area or to 
decrease in size 
Total number 
of respondents 




24  76  152 (100) 
SAP and coupled 
top-ups 
51  49  152 (100) 
 
4.  Results 
The standard accelerator investment model on the full sample (220 farms each year) is 
appropriate for the sample studied, as the coefficient for the growth in sales is positive and 
significant, indicating that investment demand is based on market opportunities (Table 2). 
Similarly for the augmented model, as the cash flow coefficient is significant and positive, it 
shows that, for at least for some farms, investment demand is sensitive to internal liquidity 
and thus internal and external funds do not act as perfect substitutes. This reveals the presence 
of financial constraints for some farms.   9 
Table 2: Results of the accelerator investment model on the full sample 
  Standard model  Augmented model 
  Coefficient  Signif.  Coefficient  Signif. 
Intercept  0.236  ***  -0.011   
Sales’ growth/total 
assets  0.534  ***  0.711  *** 
Cash flow /total assets      0.473  *** 
Dummy = 1 if period 
2001-2002  -0.305  ***  -0.228  *** 
Number of observations  440  440 
R-square  0.140  0.217 
 
As explained in the methodology section, sample farms were split into two sub-groups 
according  to  the  characteristics  that  were  thought  to  discriminate  in  respect  to  financial 
constraints. The characteristics considered in turn were the following: 
·  A/ Subsidies as a share of revenue plus subsidies. It is assumed that farms with a higher 
share  of  subsidies  are  less  constrained  as  subsidies  may  help  farms  overcome  their 
finance shortage for investment. 
·  B/  Farm  size  measured  by  their  utilised  agricultural  area  (UAA).  Size  refers  to  the 
intrinsic characteristics of the farm which may make external finance more costly for 
some  farms  than  the  others,  namely  for  small  farms  the  screening,  monitoring  and 
enforcement costs could be too high. 
·  C/ Share of output sold. More market-integrated farms (with a higher share of output 
sold) may be less financially constrained. 
·  D/ Debt to total asset ratio. Highly indebted farms may find it difficult to obtain further 
loans. On opposite, farmers who did not receive loans in the past may be less likely to be 
awarded one. 
For each sub-group A to D, the average of the sample in 2000 has been used as a threshold for 
defining the groups (share of subsidies in revenue - 5.7%; UAA - 79.9 ha; share of output sold 
- 61.5%; debt to asset ratio - 0.097). 
   10 
Model (2) is estimated for each sub-group separately. A larger and significant coefficient 
for the cash flow variable indicates that the sub-group is more constrained. Table 3 presents 
the  value  of  the  cash  flow  coefficients.  These  results  reveal  that  farmers  receiving  more 
subsidies prior to accession had better access to credit and therefore suggest that subsidies, in 
the past, have been used as a source of financing. Additionally, smaller farms, those with a 
low share of sold output and those with little indebtedness, were more credit constrained. This 
is consistent with the idea that potentially higher screening, monitoring and investment costs 
for  small  farms  limit  access  to  credit.  Similarly,  farms  that  were  less  integrated  into  the 
market and had less experience of receiving external loans were also more credit constrained. 
This  is  consistent  with  previous  studies  concerning  credit  constraints  in  the  NMS  (e.g. 
Latruffe, 2005; Petrick, 2004). 
Table 3: Cash flow coefficient of the augmented accelerator model for sub-groups  
Low share of subsidies in the revenue  0.721 
A 
High share of subsidies in the revenue   0.550 
Small UAA  0.713 
B 
Large UAA  0.529 
Low share of sold output  0.683 
C 
High share of sold output  0.352 
Low debt to asset ratio  0.641 
D 
High debt to asset ratio  0.461 
 
In a second stage, farmers’ intentions to increase/decrease or maintain their farmed area 
under the SAP are compared across sub-groups (Table 4). The share of credit constrained 
farmers  intending  to  grow  under  the  SAP  scenario  is  larger  than  under  the pre-accession 
policy. This is also the case for unconstrained farmers, but the effect is less pronounced. In 
other words, the rate of change between the share of farms intending to grow under pre-
accession policy and the share of farms intending to grow under SAP is consistently greater 
for the sub-groups that had been identified as constrained (shaded boxes in Table 4). The 
investigation  of  farmers’  intentions  therefore  suggests  that  accession  to  the  EU  and  the 
introduction of the SAP may relax the financial restraints of the more constrained farmers.   11 
Therefore, it seems that subsidies do constitute an important facilitator of on-farm investment. 
Indeed, we have been able to identify farmers receiving less subsidies prior to accession as 
more credit constrained and to find that the introduction of the SAP have a more pronounced 
effect on the plans of more credit constrained farmers, irrespective of the fact that the SAP are 
considered by the European Commission (2003) as decoupled. 
Table 4: Share of farms that intend to grow under pre-accession policy (Scenario 1) and under 









Low share of subsidies in 
the revenue  
25.2  54.1  114.7 
A 
High share of subsidies 
in the revenue  
22.4  46.3  106.7 
Small UAA  24.2  53.8  122.3 
B 
Large UAA  24.6  47.5  93.1 
Low share of sold output  23.2  50  115.5 
C 
High share of sold output  25.3  52.4  107.1 
Low debt to asset ratio  25.5  54.5  113.7 
D 
High debt to asset ratio  24  45.1  87.9 
Note: the increase rate is calculated as (Share under Scenario 2 – Share under Scenario 1)*100 / Share under 
Scenario 1. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
The implementation of the SAP in the NMS means higher and more predictable payments. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that in Lithuania it leads to a greater willingness to operate 
larger farms. Regarding the growth of land area, the introduction of the SAP and national top-
ups provided incentives to pursue expansionist farm strategies for both financially constrained 
and less financially constrained farmers. However, there is some evidence that constrained 
farmers  are  even  more  likely  to  be  willing  to  grow  than  less  constrained  farmers.  This 
suggests the existence of an income effect of the ex ante decoupled SAP. This is due to the   12 
fact that a secure direct payment can be directly reinvested or used as collateral to access 
credit.  Payments  are  thus  likely  to  facilitate  expansion,  especially  among  farmers  whose 
expansion plans were previously constrained. This is in agreement with the argument put 
forward by Sadoulet, et al (2001), that transfer programmes are likely to have an income 
multiplier effect on credit constrained farmers. Overall, these early findings also confirm that 
due to market imperfections, the introduction of CAP payments in the NMS will have ex post 
coupled effects. As farmers want to grow, implementation of the SAP will lead to the fuller 
utilisation of agricultural land and an increase in the demand for land.  
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